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This article is an exposition of the application of deterrence in 
Malawian sentencing jurisprudence. Drawing from case law, it 
explores how courts employed deterrence before 1994 and the 
role deterrence continues to play in the constitutional era. The 
paper looks at how it is reflected in the treatment of sentencing 
factors and influences sentencing policy. It also considers how 
courts have conceptualised the distinction between specific and 
general deterrence regarding the principle of proportionality and 
repeat offenders. The paper concludes with a discussion of an 
emerging attempt to go beyond deterrence towards giving 
rehabilitation a greater role in sentencing. 
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1. Introduction 
Sentencing is one of the most difficult aspects of a criminal trial, not least 
because of the competing interests that are at play. A crucial task that a 
court is faced with is determining the purpose to be served by a sentence; 
that is, whether the sentence should aim at deterrence, retribution, 
community protection or rehabilitation. The chosen purpose will inform the 
emphasis that the court places on sentencing factors. In a constitutional 
democracy like Malawi, a general question is how punishment should be 
applied in a way that is consistent with the 1994 Constitution. The 
Constitution expressly requires the state to  
… promote law and order … through the humane application and enforcement 
of laws and policing standards.1 
Chirwa aptly notes that the Bill of Rights and human dignity in particular 
have "created a new blueprint for the administration of justice".2 The 
Constitution guarantees an array of rights to every person. Section 19 
enshrines the right to human dignity. This right demands that fair 
punishment must be imposed and that it must be enforced in a humane 
manner.3 The Constitution specifically requires that human dignity must be 
respected in all judicial proceedings or any proceedings before any organ 
of state and during the enforcement of a penalty,4 and prohibits corporal 
punishment, torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or 
punishment.5 These provisions have significant implications for the aims 
and severity of criminal punishment and the manner in which it is enforced. 
The Constitution also recognises a range of rights that seek to protect the 
liberty of persons.6 The right to personal liberty is expressly protected in 
section 18. 
                                            
*  Esther Gumboh. LLB Hons (UNIMA) LLM in Criminal Law (UCT) LLD (UCT). 
Postdoctoral fellow at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Email: 
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1  Section 13(m) of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994 (the Constitution). 
Although this principle is not justiciable, courts are enjoined to have regard to it not 
only when applying and interpreting the Constitution and legislation but also when 
reviewing decisions by the executive: see Masangano v Attorney General 
Constitutional Case No 15 of 2007 (HC) 34-35 and 44-45. 
2  Chirwa Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution 126. 
3  Chirwa Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution 127. 
4  Section 19(2) of the Constitution. 
5  Section 19(3) of the Constitution. 
6  This includes the right to dignity (s 19), the prohibition of corporal punishment, 
torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, the right to 
personal liberty (s 18) and other fair trial rights in s 42, such as the right to be 
promptly informed of the reason for one's detention, to be brought before a court of 
law within 48 hours, to be released from detention with or without bail, to be detained 
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This article examines the application of deterrence in Malawian sentencing 
jurisprudence. Drawing from case law, it explores how courts employed 
deterrence before 1994 and the role it continues to play in the constitutional 
era. The paper looks at how deterrence is reflected in the treatment of 
sentencing factors and influences sentencing policy. It also considers how 
courts have conceptualised the distinction between specific and general 
deterrence with regard to the principle of proportionality and repeat 
offenders. The paper concludes with a discussion of an emerging trend to 
go beyond deterrence in order to give rehabilitation a greater role in 
sentencing. 
2. The theory of deterrence 
2.1. Definition and overview 
Deterrence is a utilitarian theory of punishment. Utilitarianism is a moral 
theory that states that the ultimate good of society is to achieve happiness 
or pleasure and to avoid pain.7 It is governed mainly by the principle of utility, 
which judges conduct by its ability to increase happiness or reduce pain.8 
An action is morally reasonable and defensible if it produces "the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number" of people.9 As a utilitarian theory, 
deterrence justifies punishment by its ability to prevent future crime in 
society.10 The punishment of an offender, though unpleasant and bringing 
unhappiness to him, is justified by its overall benefit of increasing societal 
happiness through crime prevention.11 The theorisation of deterrence is 
mainly attributed to the early works of philosophers such as Thomas 
Hobbes, Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Deterrence occurs when 
a person refrains from an action because of the fear of the possible 
unpleasant consequences of that action. It assumes that offenders or 
potential offenders will not commit further offences for fear of being 
punished. To achieve this, the punishment must be sufficient to outweigh 
                                            
in humane conditions, to challenge the lawfulness of one's detention and to be 
released immediately if such detention is unlawful. The Constitution also gives 
children additional rights such as the right to be treated in a manner that promotes 
their "reintegration into society to assume a constructive role", to not be sentenced 
to life imprisonment without the possibility of release and to be imprisoned only as 
"a last resort and for the shortest period of time consistent with justice and public 
protection". The Constitution also embraces international law as a source of law and 
an interpretative aid (s 11(2)(c)), bringing into play international standards of 
punishment. 
7  See generally Bykvist Utilitarianism 16-30. 
8  Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 11-12. 
9  Bentham "Comment on the Commentaries" 393. 
10  Marsh, Cochrane and Melville Criminal Justice 8. 
11  Hospers Human Conduct 454. 
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the profit of the offence.12 Deterrence depends on the frightening effect of 
punishment emanating from the risk of discovery and punishment 
outweighing the temptation to commit an offence.13 Deterrence can be 
specific or general. Specific deterrence aims to discourage the punished 
offender from re-offending by instilling fear in the offender of being punished 
again while general deterrence aims at preventing potential offenders from 
committing crimes.14 
The severity and certainty of punishment are key concepts in deterrence.15 
Both Beccaria16 and Bentham17 believe that punishment must exceed the 
benefits derived from the crime committed. They explain that severity 
applies to both the quantum and nature of punishment and that unjust 
punishments are those which exceed the quantum that was necessary to 
achieve deterrence.18 Beccaria adds that the quantum of punishment must 
rise with the profit of the offence.19 He regards the certainty of arrest and 
punishment as more fundamental to the preventive force of punishment 
than severity.20 Severe punishment must be coupled with the certainty not 
only of being caught but also being convicted; otherwise, the punishment 
remains a threat only on paper. In addition, punishment must be swift. 
Beccaria explains that 
[t]he more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is 
inflicted, the more just and useful it will be.21 
He further clarifies that the immediacy of punishment is crucial in that it 
ensures that punishment is seen as the inevitable consequence of crime.22 
This implies that the swiftness of punishment will add to its deterrent effect.23 
Thus, Beccaria regards the prerogative of mercy and other forms of early 
                                            
12  Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 166. 
13  Andenaes Punishment and Deterrence 7. 
14  Cavadino and Dignan Penal System 34. 
15  Apel and Nagin "General Deterrence" 412. 
16  Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
49. 
17  Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 166. 
18  Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 166; Beccaria 1764 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 49. 
19  Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
49. 
20  Maestro Cesare Beccaria 29. 
21  Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
39. 
22  Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
39. 
23  Maestro Cesare Beccaria 29. 
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release or reduction of sentences based on mitigating factors as detrimental 
to the certainty of punishment: 
To show mankind that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment 
is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, 
and is the cause of their considering every punishment inflicted as an act of 
injustice and oppression. The prince in pardoning gives up the public security 
in favour of an individual, and, by his ill−judged benevolence, proclaims a 
public act of impunity.24 
The underlying assumption of deterrence is that human beings are rational 
actors who will weigh the profit of crime against its cost, including the 
applicable punishment. Proponents of deterrence therefore accept that 
deterrence is an inappropriate consideration for the mentally ill, the young, 
or those who committed the offence while provoked.25 On the other hand, 
severe, swift, certain punishment will act as a deterrent for rational beings. 
This means that in addition to severity and certainty, the citizenry must be 
adequately informed about the applicable punishment and the actual 
sentences that are imposed on offenders.26 This is particularly important for 
general deterrence.27 Bentham states that punishment is inefficacious 
where the "the penal provision, though established, is not conveyed to the 
notice of the person on whom it seems intended that it should operate".28 
The public must also have sufficient details about the crime.29 
2.2. Critical appraisal of deterrence 
Deterrence can be credited for not ignoring the consequences of 
punishment in that it seeks to apply it for the betterment of society. 
Consequently, it may be relevant in assessing harsh punishment that 
satisfies retribution but has no benefit to society. This would be vital in 
assessing the acceptability of some forms of punishment. However, 
deterrence has its own problems which disqualify it from being a dominant 
penal theory. 
The first criticism of deterrence is that it runs the danger of justifying 
excessive punishment based on its perceived positive consequences. 
Consequently, it dehumanises an offender, failing to recognise man as an 
end in himself. This is contrary to the principle put forward by Kant that 
                                            
24  Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
80.  
25  Fox and Freiberg Sentencing 211. 
26  Christopher 2002 NWULR 856. 
27  Zimring Perspectives on Deterrence 76. 
28  Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 160. 
29  Geerken and Gove 1975 Law & Soc'y Rev 507. 
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human beings are ends in themselves and should not be treated as means 
to an end.30 In S v Makwanyane, the South African Constitutional Court held 
that deterrence "instrumentalises the offender for state policy", 
dehumanises … and objectifies him … as a tool for crime control. This 
objectification … strips the offender of his … human dignity.31 
However, this criticism is valid only where, for the purposes of deterrence, 
the punishment imposed on an offender is increased beyond that which is 
otherwise proportional to the offence committed. 
Another weakness with deterrence is that it is often used to justify stiffer 
sentences. Any penal policy that increases the length or nature of the 
punishment applicable is generally based on deterrence.32 The problem is 
that deterrence fails to provide a measure for the quantum of punishment. 
If penalties must be "sufficiently" severe, then the prevalence of an offence 
will mean that a punishment has not achieved general or specific 
deterrence, which in turn will be taken to mean that the punishment is too 
lenient. Therefore, harsher sentences may be imposed if the desired effect 
is not achieved.33 In some cases, the law may even resort to mandatory and 
minimum sentences. These sentences run the risk of disproportionality 
because they restrict or rule out a court's sentencing discretion and 
therefore ignore the circumstances of an offender. Proportionality requires 
that a sentence must be tailored to fit the circumstances of the crime and 
the offender. This cannot be properly achieved if a court does not have the 
discretion to individualise a sentence. 
Deterrence focuses mainly on whether the punishment is sufficiently severe 
to act as a deterrent; thereby trivialising the circumstances of the offence 
and the offender. Therefore, a penal system based solely on deterrence is 
likely to achieve only skewed justice. Ignoring the individual means that 
deterrence is not prepared to accept the reformation of an offender as 
another aim of punishment or the importance of early release mechanisms. 
This undermines the individual even further and may violate the right to 
dignity and the prohibition of cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment.34 
                                            
30  Kant "Penal Law and the Law of Pardon" 31-32. 
31  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 313 and 316. 
32  Apel and Nagin "General Deterrence" 412. 
33  Wasik Emmins on Sentencing 46. 
34  The absence of an early release mechanism may render life and long-term 
imprisonment unconstitutional. See, for instance, Vinter v United Kingdom 
Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, Merits, 9 July 2013 (ECtHR); 
Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECtHR. International standards for punishment dictate that 
all prisoners must be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of 
release. See, for instance, art 10(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Lastly, there are questions about whether deterrence works in practice and 
whether stiffer punishments help to reduce crime. There is no doubt that 
penalties do have a general deterrent effect.35 Indeed, few would argue that 
people would refrain from committing crimes if criminal activity attracted a 
reward. However, the relationship between the severity of punishment and 
its deterrent effect is a complicated one. Proponents of deterrence like 
Andenaes state that this complication arises because the fear of 
punishment is not the only factor that serves as a disincentive to committing 
crimes; the state of mind of the public and the intensity of policing are also 
important.36 More importantly, some people are deterred by moral 
considerations or fear of disapproval from those close to them, regardless 
of the severity of the punishment or knowledge of it.37 Admittedly, the nature 
and severity of punishment is the easiest factor to regulate. 
In summary, deterrence aims to prevent crime through the threat of 
punishment. This would necessitate that factors like the prevalence of the 
crime should be considered when sentencing an offender. Although there is 
no conclusive evidence as to how far deterrence works, it can play a limited 
role in punishment. People may learn from punishment, and it may thus 
provide a disincentive to crime. However, as noted above, a purely 
deterrence-based policy can result in harsh sentences. Proportionality 
considerations must therefore play a role in deciding the severity of 
punishment. Further, considering the inconclusive evidence regarding the 
relation between the severity of punishment and its deterrent effect, the 
legislature and the courts should be wary of increasing punishment as 
though deterrence were "an article of faith".38 The personal circumstances 
of the offender should also be considered. 
Lastly, by requiring that the law and punishment must be communicated to 
the public, deterrence reinforces the principle of legality, which requires that 
criminal laws must be clear so that ordinary people know the proscribed 
conduct and its punishment. This will make punishment a proactive, as 
opposed to a reactive, measure against crime. 
                                            
Political Rights (1966) which provides that the penitentiary system shall have as its 
essential aim the reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners. Various UN and 
regional instruments and the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies echo 
the need for a prospect of release: see Gumboh 2017 JAL. 
35  Van Den Haag 1982 J Crim L & Criminology 1034. 
36  Andenaes Punishment and Deterrence 22. 
37  Cavadino and Dignan Penal System 36. 
38  Fox and Freiberg Sentencing 210. 
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3. Deterrence in Malawian sentencing jurisprudence 
3.1. Deterrence before 1994 
Before the Constitution was adopted in 1994, the aims of punishment were 
largely deduced from the aims of criminal law. It was recognised that the 
aim of criminal law was not just retribution but ultimately crime prevention. 
Therefore, the courts emphasised crime prevention as the primary purpose 
of punishment. This required that deterrence and community protection 
(incapacitation) should be the priority in sentencing. In R v Robert,39 Villiera 
J held: 
The first and foremost [consideration in sentencing] is the public interest. The 
criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, 
but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence passed in public serves 
the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to 
try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition that if the 
offender is caught and brought to justice the punishment will be negligible. 
Such a sentence may also deter the particular offender from committing a 
crime again or induce him to turn from criminal to honest living. 
Accordingly, deterrence and community protection were individually seen 
as major aims of punishment.40 Community protection was often regarded 
as a justification for imposing long and immediate sentences for serious 
offences. In Banda and Others v Rep,41 the Malawi Supreme Court of 
Appeal (MSCA) held that serious offences should be severely punished with 
long prison sentences to protect the public, and that the goal of public 
protection would in such cases justify an order that the sentences should 
run consecutively. Similarly, in Rep v Phale42 the court held that community 
protection was a justification for imposing otherwise harsh sentences in 
serious cases. Apart from community protection, long and immediate 
sentences were also considered necessary in serious cases to mark the 
gravity and public disapproval of the offence, and to punish the offender.43 
The pursuit of community protection and deterrence, especially where the 
offence was serious, would also justify a departure from sentencing 
principles provided this did not result in an extraordinarily excessive 
sentence.44 
                                            
39  R v Robert [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 291 (HC) 293. 
40  Rep v Mpira [1982-1984] 10 ALR Mal 67 (HC). 
41  Banda v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 56 (SCA) 59.  
42  Rep v Phale [1991] 14 MLR 438 (HC). 
43  Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC). 
44  Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA); Kumwenda v Rep (1993) 16(1) MLR 
233 (SCA). 
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In employing deterrence the courts distinguished between specific and 
general deterrence. Specific deterrence provided the rationale for 
considering an offender's criminal record in sentencing; unlike first 
offenders, repeat offenders were not entitled to leniency.45 The reason for 
this was that a repeat offender showed that he had not learnt from or been 
deterred by his previous punishment. This rationale was evident, for 
example, in the general principle that the significance of previous 
convictions diminished with time.46 The justification for this principle was that 
a lapse of time between the previous conviction and the current one must 
be considered in the offender's favour as an indication that the defendant 
has demonstrated that he tried to lead a clean life.47 In 1964, however, Cram 
J held that a reasonable and proper sentence is one that is appropriate to 
the offence and the circumstances and that is not enhanced merely because 
the convict has previous convictions:48 
[I]t is not right to hold over a man's past offences which have been dealt with 
by appropriate sentences, as we must assume [that] past offences have been 
dealt with, and add them up and increase … the severity of sentence for a 
later offence. That is dangerously like punishing a man twice for an offence. If 
a man who has been convicted shows himself unresponsive to leniency and 
persists in life of crime, that is a reason for giving him the proper and deserved 
sentence in the particular case. If, on the other hand, there are some merits, 
it may be that the court will treat him more leniently because he has shown 
himself in some way responsive to the warning which he has had. 
General deterrence, aimed at deterring potential offenders, entailed that the 
prevalence of an offence was a basis for increasing a sentence.49 This 
meant that like community protection, general deterrence was often used to 
justify stiff sentences in the form of long and immediate imprisonment in 
punishing serious cases.50 In addition, it justified departure from established 
sentencing principles.51 Suspended sentences were generally seen as 
inadequate for general deterrence. In Rep v Nabanda,52 for example, 
                                            
45  R v White [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 401 (HC); Bwanali v R [1964-1966] 3 ALR Mal 
329 (HC). Compare Makawa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 196 of 1975 (HC) where 
previous convictions were used to justify the imposition of the maximum penalty; 
Maikolo v R [1964-1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA); Rep v Havula [1991] 14 MLR 429 
(HC); Chief Public Prosecutor v Nkosi [1990] 13 MLR 97 (HC) (previous convictions 
are evidence of bad character). 
46  Rendall-Day v Rep [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 155 (HC). 
47  John v Rep Criminal Appeal No 131 of 1975 (HC), where a lapse of six years 
prompted the court to disregard the offender's criminal record.  
48  Maikolo v R [1964-1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 594. 
49  Rep v Phiri [1993] 16(2) MLR 748 (HC); R v Zagwa [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 415 
(HC). 
50  Rep v Katole [1993] 16(1) MLR 472 (HC); Mpondamwala v Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR 
Mal 306 (HC). 
51  Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA). 
52  [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 166 (HC). 
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Unyolo J held that a serious offence like child stealing should be punished 
with immediate imprisonment because a suspended sentence would send 
a wrong signal to the offender and potential offenders.  
Interestingly, courts were of the view that general deterrence was not a 
suitable goal of punishment for first and young offenders. Hence, courts 
often refrained from imposing lengthy sentences on these offenders. 
Relying on Rep v Banda,53 the court held in Rep v Domingo54 that it is in the 
public interest that young offenders must not be used as ends for general 
deterrence. It added that where young offenders were concerned, general 
deterrence might still be achieved through short sentences.55 The rationale 
for this was that general deterrence entailed long sentences which were 
deemed unsuitable for such offenders as they would inhibit their 
rehabilitation. This reasoning clearly underscores the fact that general 
deterrence was synonymous with long sentences. 
It is important to mention that courts generally viewed first offenders as more 
likely to respond positively to punishment or the threat of punishment. For 
instance, Jere J remarked in Rep v Matindi:56 
The philosophy behind [suspended sentences] is that first offenders should 
be kept out of prison because contact with hardened criminals might have a 
bad influence on them, and, secondly, they should be given a chance to mend 
their ways but with a real threat that if they commit another offence during the 
period, the suspended sentence will be revived. In this way, therefore, the 
suspended sentence provides an incentive to first offenders to keep the law. 
This reasoning presupposes that first offenders have a greater chance of 
changing their ways than repeat offenders. Thus, specific deterrence was 
likely to be achieved when dealing with first offenders. In fact, according to 
Chatsika J,  
[i]t has been proved in certain cases that certain persons who are tempted to 
commit offences thinking that they would not be found, refrain from falling into 
similar temptations, when they have once been found and subjected to terms 
of imprisonment which have been suspended.57 
The soundness of this position is considered in section 4.3.1 below. 
                                            
53  Rep v Banda [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 166 (HC), 7. 
54  Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990 (HC). 
55  See also Rep v Nthara [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 338 (HC); Maniote v Rep [1984-
1986] 11 ALR Mal 174 (HC); Rep v Phiri [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 176 (HC). 
56  Rep v Matindi Confirmation Case No 1699 of 1976 (HC). 
57  Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975 (HC). 
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3.2. Deterrence after 1994 
The judicial position on the role of deterrence has not changed much since 
1994. In Rep v Alick, deterrence was described as "the primary purpose of 
punishment and the criminal process".58 Similarly, Rep v Kufandiko59 held 
that the first and foremost issues among public interest considerations 
during sentencing are deterrence and antecedents. Also, it is generally 
believed that deterrence calls for stiffer sentences.60 However, unlike before 
1994, it is now stressed and readily accepted that the purposes of 
sentencing are not to be confused with sentencing principles.61 Therefore, 
it is not acceptable to invoke deterrence as a justification for imposing 
sentences that are otherwise disproportional to the offence and the 
offender. 
Deterrence is usually employed for prevalent, serious and violent offences 
such as robbery, burglary,62 housebreaking,63 rape and theft by a servant.64 
General deterrence is also invoked in punishing offences involving the 
obstruction of public duty and the administration of justice such as resisting 
lawful arrest65 and escaping from lawful custody.66 In such cases immediate 
imprisonment is likely to be imposed, to send out a warning to potential 
offenders. Further, in order to maximise the deterrent effect, it has been held 
that sentences for serious offences should run consecutively to a sentence 
that is being served.67 The courts have stressed that as a general principle 
serious and prevalent offences must be punished with long and immediate 
imprisonment.68 This is departed from only in "extremely rare" or exceptional 
circumstances when the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors 
                                            
58  Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000 (HC). 
59  Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009 (HC). 
60  Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008 (HC) 4. 
61  Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003 (HC). 
62  Rep v Misomali Confirmation Case No 527 of 1996 (HC). 
63  Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC); Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 726 of 
2000 (HC) (irrespective of the mitigating factors, a simple burglary should be 
punished with no less than three years).  
64  Rep v Madando [1995] 2 MLR 733 (HC); Banda v Rep Criminal Appeal No 221 of 
2009 (HC). 
65  Rep v Harry [1997] 1 MLR 119 (HC); Rep v Matiki [1997] 1 MLR 159 (HC). 
66  Rep v Lampu Confirmation Case No 89 of 1996 (HC); Rep v Gwaza [1995] 2 MLR 
752 (HC) 754 ("The news of escape from prison may spread to inmates like bushfire 
and they may attempt to try their luck too"). 
67  Rep v Gwaza [1995] 2 MLR 752 (HC) 754. See also Rep v Matiki [1997] 1 MLR 159 
(HC) 162, holding that a sentence for resisting lawful arrest must run consecutively 
to a sentence for the substantive offence. 
68  Mtetera v Rep Criminal Appeal No 88 of 2005 (HC); Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal 
No 93 of 2005 (HC) 5; Rep v Austin Confirmation Case No 1222 of 2003 (HC); Rep 
v Mzuzi Confirmation Case No 1607 of 1998 (HC). 
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"considerably", such that a court may opt to suspend the sentence or 
impose a non-custodial one.69 
However, the fact that an offence is serious does not imply that 
imprisonment must be imposed automatically. The Magistrate's court 
sentencing guidelines state that reasons must be given as to why an offence 
is so serious as to justify imprisonment.70 In practice, however, serious 
offences are still likely to attract long and immediate imprisonment, even in 
the presence of strong mitigating factors:71 
[S]ome crimes are so heinous that a plea of youth, a plea that the crime was 
a first offence or that the offender has never been in prison before is irrelevant. 
Those who participate in such crimes should know that they will be subjected 
to long and immediate imprisonment, though they are young, even if they 
pleaded guilty, even if they had no previous convictions, even if the victims 
were neither young nor infirm. Courts will not readily accede to pleas of guilty 
or the age of the defendant where offences are very serious and committed in 
the most austere of circumstances.72 
Courts have gone even further to prescribe starting points for various 
offences and flagged them for long and immediate imprisonment. These 
include rape (six years),73 robbery (three74 or four75 years), burglary and 
housebreaking (six years),76 arson (three years)77 and theft of cattle (12 
months).78 The Sentencing guidelines adopt this approach and prescribe 
starting points for about 43 offences.79 Shorter sentences are considered 
more appropriate for what are deemed to be less serious offences such as 
breaking into a building, minor cases of sexual indecency, petty frauds, 
assaults and other instances of violence causing minor injuries.80 
                                            
69  Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC) 72. 
70  Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines. 
71  Mussa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 44 of 1995 (HC). 
72  Also see Rep v Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC) 601; Rep v Mtaya Confirmation Case 
No 98 of 1995 (HC); Mbekeani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 48 of 2006 (HC) 20; Lusale 
v Rep Criminal Case No 141 of 2005 (HC); Lobo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 110 of 
2008 (HC). 
73  Rep v Ndamera Confirmation Case No 314 of 2001 (HC). Compare Rep v Msowoya 
[1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC) 394, recommending three years as the starting 
point for rape if the aggravating factors equal the mitigating factors. 
74  Rep v Harry [1997] 2 MLR 74 (HC). 
75  Rep v Napulula Confirmation Case No 665 of 2003 (HC). 
76  Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) (hereafter Chizumila). 
77  Rep v Kathumba [1997] 1 MLR 390 (HC) 392; Rep v Chitseko Confirmation Case 
No 78 of 1997 (HC). See also see Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing 
Guidelines 40. 
78  Rep v Phiri [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC) 94. If the matter involves goats, the starting point 
is six months: see Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines 30. 
79  See Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines 9-51. 
80  Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998 (HC). 
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The general principle that serious offences must be punished with 
immediate imprisonment is also underscored by considerations of 
community protection which may require that an offender should be 
removed from society. However, the principle is also accentuated by the 
perception that non-custodial sentences and short prison terms are 
generally insufficient for deterrence.81 
3.3. Deterrence and other sentencing factors 
Deterrence is also reflected in the emphasis placed on some sentencing 
factors such as previous convictions and domestic obligations. While most 
cases continue to consider previous convictions in sentencing,82 some 
courts have criticised this practice. For example, Rep v Sozinyo83 held that, 
except where statute provides for an enhanced sentence for a second 
offence,84 enhancing a sentence based on previous convictions is  
… tantamount to punishing an offender twice over for offences for which he 
has already been punished.85 
It can be argued that if enhancing a sentence based on previous convictions 
breaches the principle of double jeopardy and therefore the right to a fair 
trial, it is fictitious to regard legislation-sanctioned enhancements any 
differently.  
                                            
81  Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC). In Rep v Josephy Confirmation Case No 261 
of 2013 (HC), a short immediate sentence of six months was justified on the basis 
that it was imposed for deterrent purposes and that community service is not 
generally seen as fit for this purpose. 
82  See for instance Rep v Phiri [1996] MLR 365 (HC); Moses v Rep Confirmation Case 
No 140 of 2011 (HC); Rep v Kafwambira Confirmation Case No 37 of 2008 (HC); 
Rep v Jumbe Criminal Appeal No 565 of 2008 (HC); Dandaula v Rep Criminal Appeal 
No 11 of 2008 (HC). The failure to respond to past sentences may affect the 
seriousness of an offence: see Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing 
Guidelines 53. 
83  Rep v Sozinyo [1997] 2 MLR 16 (HC).  
84  Malawian statutory law is awash with provisions that prescribe higher sentences for 
a second offence: see ss 88(3) (official corruption), 169(4) (offences relating to 
gaming houses), 180 (idle and disorderly persons), 184 (rogues and vagabonds) and 
183(1) (nuisances by drunken persons) and 290 (theft) of the Penal Code, Chapter 
7:01 of the Laws of Malawi; ss 29, 90(11), 126(4)(c), 128(9)(b), 141(3), 152(4)(b), 
153(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Act, Chapter 69:01 of the Laws of Malawi.  
85  Rep v Sozinyo [1997] 2 MLR 16 (HC) 18. See also Rep v Chizenga Confirmation 
Case No 297 of 2008 (HC); Rep v Ngomwa Confirmation Case No 1021 of 2003 
(HC) 2 (previous offences "must be deemed to have been paid for by the penalties 
that attached to them and so they do not attract extra punishment, so to speak"); 
Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005 (HC) (it is wrong to base 
sentence on the fact that the accused is not a first offender). 
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The treatment of pleas of family hardship or obligations also highlights the 
significance of deterrence in punishment.86 These pleas usually arise in 
connection with immediate imprisonment as it involves the removal of an 
offender from his family and exposes him to the risk of losing a job. The 
general rule is that domestic obligations are not relevant to sentencing, let 
alone the decision to imprison.87 Departure from this general rule will be 
justified only if imprisonment will cause "unusual or exceptional hardship" to 
the offender's family, if the domestic obligations are "exceptional or 
unusual", or there are unusual or exceptional circumstances.88 Courts have 
often said that the possibility of imprisonment and resulting family hardship 
should have acted as a deterrent to committing crime in the first place. 
Chipeta J has stated that 
[a] man who opts for and goes ahead to commit a crime should factor in the 
possibility that if the long arm of the law catches up with him and accords him 
a custodial penalty, his family will suffer and that the courts are not 
encouraged to be moved by such pleas.89 
Similarly, Millo v Rep held that  
… offenders should put domestic matters in the equation when embarking in 
conduct society disapproves and enforces with criminal sanctions.90 
                                            
86  The rejection of family obligations is also partly based on retribution and community 
protection: see Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003 (HC) (considering family 
obligations may detract a court from imposing the right sentence by making it focus 
on the hardship a sentence may inflict on an offender's family); Chitsonga v Rep 
[1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 88 (family hardship due to imprisonment is part of the price to 
pay when committing a crime). 
87  Kanyinji v Rep Criminal Appeal No 116 of 2008 (HC); Rep v Mutawo Confirmation 
Case No 237 of 1999 (HC) (the obvious reason for rejecting domestic matters in 
sentencing is that offenders know that "they are likely to be sent to prison and that 
this will affect their children"); Millo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2000 (HC) (public 
interest in criminal justice cannot be "easily dispelled by domestic considerations" 
and it "would be precariously compromised if courts unduly consider such matters"); 
Rep v Chimbelenga (1996) MLR 342 (HC) 354 (family responsibilities not considered 
in sentencing offender to 30 years for stealing over K1 million from the government). 
88  Rep v Mafaiti Confirmation Case No 660 of 1990 (HC); Rep v Mutawo Confirmation 
Case No 237 of 1999 (HC); Rep v Asidi Confirmation Case No 955 of 1999 (HC); 
Rep v Chilenje [1996] MLR 361 (HC) – test for exceptional circumstances is satisfied 
where the effect of imprisonment is to deprive young children of parental care or 
where a close family member is terminally ill. In other cases, courts have readily 
regarded ordinary family responsibilities as mitigating without applying the 
exceptional hardship test or having regard to the seriousness of the offence: see 
Makanjira v Rep Criminal Appeal No 67 of 2007 (HC) (offender responsible for 
grandparents and orphans); Rep v Kachimanga Confirmation Case No 1746 of 2007 
(HC) (caring for old grandmother accepted as mitigating factor); Daukire v Rep 
Criminal Appeal No 148 of 2004 (HC); Rep v Chinthiti (2) [1997] 1 MLR 70 (HC). 
89  Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003 (HC) 3. Also see Kapolo v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 82 of 2007 (HC). 
90  Millo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2000 (HC). 
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The underlying assumption here is that offenders weigh their options 
carefully before committing an offence. 
3.4. Specific versus general deterrence 
Courts continue to distinguish between specific and general deterrence.91 
In Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni and Others,92 Banda CJ was of the view 
that a first custodial sentence should be aimed at specific and not general 
deterrence. It was held in White v Rep93 that a sentence should not be 
suspended if the aim is to achieve general deterrence such as where the 
offence is serious and public safety has been compromised such that 
meaningful and punitive sentences are deserved.94 
According to Rep v Nkhoma,95 general deterrence should attract lengthier 
sentences with an added "premium" of imprisonment for deterrent 
purposes.96 This literally means that sentences imposed for general 
deterrence are in effect disproportionate sentences. In fact, Rep v Chikwana 
unequivocally states that general deterrence entails  
… passing a sentence that is beyond one the offender deserves based on the 
crime committed.97 
Chikopa J observed in Rep v Nkhata that punishment should not be used 
as a warning to the general public because this is punishing an offender for 
wrongs he has not committed.98 It was said in Rep v Sakhwinya that general 
deterrence  
… is immoral because it leaves the feeling that human beings can be used as 
a means to an end and … it may be a cruel and degrading punishment under 
section 19(3) of the Constitution.99 
                                            
91  Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 (HC) (special deterrence is directed 
at preventing an offender from committing further crime); Rep v Kufandiko 
Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009 (HC) 3 (a general deterrent sentence is an 
exemplary sentence imposed to prevent others from committing crimes). 
92  Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni [1995] 2 MLR 567 (HC) 569, citing R v Curran 57 Cr 
App R 945. 
93  White v Rep Criminal Appeal No 19 of 2007 (HC).  
94  Compare Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996: "The question of 
suspension of a sentence, a principle of sentencing, should be treated distinctively 
from the question of deterrence ... The question of suspension arises after, not 
before, an appropriate prison sentence has been arrived". 
95  Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 (HC). 
96  Also see Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995 (HC). 
97  Rep v Chikwana Confirmation Case No 131 of 2013 (HC) 4. 
98  Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003 (HC). 
99  Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013 (HC) 3.  
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Similarly, it was observed in Rep v Jeke that a sentence based on general 
deterrence  
… is wrong in principle because it is tantamount to using (or is it abusing) 
humans as means to an end. Such sentences would be degrading cruel and 
inhuman(e) punishment or treatment.100 
These sentiments have been reiterated in several High Court judgments 
such as Rep v Kanena,101 Rep v Foster,102 Rep v Naphazi,103 Rep v 
Tembo,104 Rep v Kaufa,105 Rep v Mulolo106 and Rep v Kanyumba107 to 
mention a few. However, except for the views expressed in Rep v Nkhata,108 
all these sentiments have been expressed only to show that general 
deterrence is an inappropriate goal for the punishment of first offenders. In 
other words, the criticisms are justification for not imposing general 
deterrent sentences on first and young offenders, except where the offence 
is very serious. The general view is that sentences imposed on first 
offenders "can only be as [to] fit the offence and only for the purpose of 
reforming or preventing the offender from committing offences in the 
future".109 
3.5. Limiting the instrumentalisation argument: The special treatment 
of first and young offenders 
For first and young offenders, general deterrence is readily accepted by the 
courts as an automatic consequence of punishment. For instance, 
entrenching the position before 1994, it is often stated that punishment 
                                            
100  Rep v Jeke Confirmation Case No 178B of 2013 (HC) 4-5. 
101  Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 2013 (HC). 
102  Rep v Foster Confirmation Case No 1690 of 2005 (HC) 9. 
103  Rep v Naphazi Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011 (HC) 4.  
104  Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 187 of 2013 (HC). 
105  Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 314 of 2011 (HC) 3. 
106  Rep v Mulolo Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012 (HC) 4. 
107  Rep v Kanyumba Confirmation Case No 904 of 2008 (HC) 4. 
108  Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003 (HC), holding that punishment 
should not be used as a warning to the general public because this is punishing an 
offender for wrongs he has not committed. 
109  Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013 (HC) 3. Also see Rep v Alick 
Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000 (HC) (the preference for specific deterrence in 
cases of young and first offenders means that sentences in such cases "should fit 
the crime, the offender the victim and the public interest in preventing crime"); Rep 
v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997 (HC) ("it should be really seldom that 
first offenders should receive sentences whose purpose is to prevent others from 
crime. Consequently, a first offender should only receive [a punishment that 
prevents] him from further mischief. This will be achieved if the sentence fits the 
crime, the offender, the plight of the victim and the public interest in preventing 
crime"). Also see Rep v Headson Confirmation Case No 129 of 2013 (HC) 4. 
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imposed on first and young offenders should only aim at specific deterrence 
and that general deterrence may still be achieved as "a matter of course".110 
It has been held that first and young offenders should not be used as 
"means to the end of",111 "as guinea pigs"112 or "scapegoats"113 for general 
deterrence and that  
[s]uch sentences would be degrading cruel and [inhumane] punishment or 
treatment.114 
It has been held that such offenders may be reformed or deterred from 
future crime by the likelihood or certainty of punishment rather than its 
severity.115 Therefore, it is considered that for first and young offenders, "a 
short, sharp and quick sentence may just be as effective as a longer one".116 
For repeat offenders, however, the use of sentences aimed at general 
deterrence is justified because society should be protected from repeat 
criminal conduct.117 In other words, longer sentences are more appropriate 
for repeat offenders as they have not been deterred by previous punishment 
and are unlikely to be deterred by the likelihood of punishment.  
The reluctance of courts to employ general deterrence as a justification for 
the punishment of first and young offenders reflects the criticism advanced 
earlier against deterrence and utilitarianism in general, namely, the 
instrumentalisation of an offender. What is unique with the sentencing 
jurisprudence in Malawi is that courts regard general deterrence as an 
unsuitable goal for the punishment of first and young offenders. This 
qualified criticism of general deterrence raises questions in the light of the 
Bill of Rights. For instance, is it acceptable for a second custodial sentence 
to be disproportionate? Secondly, how justifiable is general deterrence for 
offenders other than first and young offenders?  
It can be argued that courts are overly speculative when it comes to 
justifying leniency in sentencing first and young offenders. With respect, 
there seems to be no demonstrable basis for claims such as that lengthy 
sentences "backfire" by breeding vengeance which may promote 
                                            
110  Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999 (HC); Mtanga v Rep Criminal 
Appeal No 15 of 1998 (HC). 
111  Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000 (HC); Rep v Mwakikunga 
Confirmation Case No 326 of 1998 (HC). 
112  Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 (HC). 
113  Rep v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997 (HC). Also see Mwachilira v Rep 
Criminal Appeal Case No 86 of 2006 (HC) (there is something "unwholesome" about 
using first offenders as a means to an end). 
114  Rep v Samson Confirmation Case No 169 of 2013 (HC) 4-5. 
115  Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013 (HC). 
116  Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013 (HC). 
117  See Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009 (HC) 6. 
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recidivism. In any event, there is no reason why the claim, if true, should not 
hold true for other offenders as well, unless, of course, they are locked away 
for such a long time that by the time they are released they are too old to 
commit certain crimes.  
The qualified use of general deterrence is clearly rooted in the 
conceptualisation of general deterrence as synonymous with 
disproportionately lengthy sentences. Restricting general deterrence to 
repeat offenders is essentially an endorsement that they may be punished 
with disproportional sentences. This downplays the instrumentalisation of 
repeat offenders. The selective application of general deterrence is partly 
justified on the grounds of community protection. However, the need to 
protect society does not arise from the fact that the offender is not a first 
offender but rather from the extent to which the offence compromises public 
safety. Surely, a first-time murderer compromises public safety more than a 
repeat petty offender? An argument can be made that the way in which 
general deterrence is applied in Malawi is indefensible considering the rights 
to human dignity and equality. If general deterrence reduces an offender to 
a "guinea pig" then it should be a wholly objectionable goal of punishment 
regardless of the status of an offender. As held in Makwanyane, the 
instrumentalisation of an offender violates the right to human dignity.118 The 
age or criminal record of an offender is of no consequence. Otherwise, 
compliance with the non-discrimination injunction in section 20 of the 
Constitution may be called into question.  
The discussion on deterrence reveals that the way general deterrence is 
applied in Malawi results in sentences that are inconsistent with the principle 
of proportionality and therefore violates the right to human dignity and the 
prohibition of cruel, inhumane and degrading punishment. Once the element 
of disproportionality in general deterrent sentences is removed, the 
justification for not imposing general deterrent sentences on first and young 
offenders becomes vague. The concern will then be whether the sentence 
is proportional to the offence and the offender. If, as has been suggested in 
various sentencing judgments, general deterrence can be achieved as "a 
matter of course", then there is no reason to actively pursue it by increasing 
sentences.  
In view of the foregoing, there is no proper justification for not applying the 
same objections against general deterrence to repeat offenders. General 
deterrence should be an objectionable goal of punishment if it results in 
sentences that are cruel, inhuman or degrading by reducing an offender to 
                                            
118  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 313 and 316. 
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a "guinea pig" or "a means to an end". It should not make any difference 
whether an offender is a first or repeat offender, young or old. The reason 
for this is that the right to human dignity is violated if offenders are reduced 
to a means to an end. Criticism from some judges that general deterrence 
is generally an inappropriate aim of punishment lends credence to the 
argument that the way general deterrence is understood and applied in 
Malawi results in sentences that are disproportionate and inconsistent with 
the right to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel, inhumane and 
degrading punishment.  
The selective application of general deterrence also defies the deterrent 
effect of the certainty of punishment. As noted earlier, the certainty of 
punishment is a key concept in deterrence theory in general, and if there is 
no likelihood of actually being caught, prosecuted and punished, a person 
is likely to commit a crime. There is no compelling reason for applying the 
certainty principle to young offenders only. 
3.6. Deterrence and sentencing policy 
The High Court has held that whether or not a sentence in fact achieves 
deterrence should be the concern of penologists and not courts.119 It has 
also found that where certain levels of sentences are incapable of affecting 
crime, it is in the public interest that courts should shift their sentencing 
policy so that it reflects the public interest in curbing crime.120 According to 
Rep v Adam,121 
[w]hen that point is reached, individual personal circumstances have to be 
weighed against public interest. The way forward, a way justified by public 
policy, is to attach a premium on conventional sentences to reflect the need 
to deter crime by enhancing sentences. 
Consequently, deterrence has been used as a justification for increasing the 
levels of sentencing where past sentences are perceived to have been 
unsuccessful in reducing crime. For example, Rep v Bayani122 held that the 
prevalence of an offence means that the prevailing sentencing policy has 
failed to dissuade potential or repeat offenders because of inadequate 
punishment either as provided by statute or as passed by courts. The court 
held that in the latter scenario, the solution is for courts to generally increase 
the sentences imposed. Similarly, Rep v Nyungwe,123 held that the 
                                            
119  Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995 (HC) 2. 
120  Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995 (HC) 2. 
121  Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995 (HC) 2. 
122  Rep v Bayani Confirmation Case No 11 of 2000 (HC). 
123  Rep v Nyungwe [1997] 2 MLR 127 (HC) 130. 
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"phenomenal upsurge" in burglary cases at the time was partly because of 
"the sentencing policy of our courts", which passed "medium sentences" on 
offenders.  
It was this perception that lengthier sentences could curb crime that 
prompted the issuance of the sentencing guideline two decades ago in 
Chizumila, one of the earliest reported cases after 1994, that has had a 
great impact on sentencing trends for burglary and housebreaking. The 
allegation in Chizumila is that short sentences are responsible for the 
increase in burglary cases and that mob justice is a result of public 
dissatisfaction with lenient sentences.124 Thus, the court suggested a 
departure from lenient sentences in cases of burglary and housebreaking, 
recommending that the starting point for burglary should be six years.125 At 
the time, this was about six times and twice the average sentence previously 
imposed on first and repeat offenders respectively.126 Similar reasoning is 
evident in Mulewa v Rep127 where the court, despite noting that long 
sentences have not necessarily led to a decrease in crime and uncertainty 
as to whether the length of sentences was responsible for the increase in 
crime, imposed a higher sentence to curb crime and the incidence of mob 
justice. This tendency has been justified on the basis that courts should be 
responsive to public outcry.128 In other words, the lengthier sentences are 
meant to satisfy public sentiment.  
It is noteworthy that some cases have not supported the general principle 
that serious offences should be punished with long and immediate 
imprisonment. For example, it was said in Rep v Limbani that in view of 
prison conditions, courts should follow "a deliberate policy of decongesting 
prisons" by imposing short sentences even for serious offences such as 
manslaughter, robbery, rape, defilement, burglary, housebreaking, the theft 
of a bicycle, the theft of livestock "and many more … in the category of 
serious offences".129  
The High Court has pointed out that guidelines that emphasise long periods 
of imprisonment for serious offences are skewed because they ignore the 
importance of the reformation of the offender and focus only on retributive 
                                            
124  Chizumila 306. 
125  Chizumila 306. 
126  Chizumila 306: "Up to about three months ago [September 1994], sentences passed 
by the courts have generally been short-term sentences ranging between 9-30 
months for burglary. Longer sentences of up to 36 months have been reserved for 
repeat offenders". 
127  Mulewa v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC). 
128  Rep v Makata Confirmation Case 968 of 1996 (HC). 
129  Rep v Limbani Confirmation Case No 839 of 2005 (HC) 2. 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  21 
justice and deterrence without any consideration of the negative 
consequences of long sentences both on an offender and on others.130 
Contending that short sentences can be as effective as long sentences and 
that the criminals are deterred more by getting caught and punished, Ndovi 
J observed in Rep v Kholoviko:131 
The courts must also consider how such long sentences that are advocated 
can deter other accused persons, present as well as future ones. There is no 
evidence that these offences have reduced by reason of long sentences. In 
fact, they are on the increase. For first time offenders, not only common sense 
but the law as well, require[s] that they should not be sent to prison willy-nilly. 
They should only be sent to prison if there are real and compelling reasons 
for doing so. This court does not believe, nor is it convinced, that mere trend 
or level or even conventional sentences alone have any impact on the 
accused himself. It may have merit on generating confidence in the courts and 
promoting the concept of predictability of the sentences that the courts will 
impose generally, but there is no real impact on deterrence and reformation. 
The court added that effectiveness in law enforcement as seen for instance 
through arrests, convictions and the recovery of stolen property, which may 
deter a person from embarking on a criminal career by creating  
… a lingering possibility of being caught and deprived of the fruits of his or her 
nefarious activity.132 
These views have not found much common ground. In fact, post-1994 
sentencing practices indicate a gradual increase in the severity of 
sentences. For instance, in some cases the recommended starting points 
for serious offences have tripled.133 Furthermore, although the justification 
for leniency in dealing with first and young offenders has remained largely 
the same after 1994, the duration of the sentences imposed on them has 
increased. Courts have advocated stiffer sentences in view of public opinion 
and the prevalence of serious offences.134 The Sentencing guidelines now 
provide for starting points that are much higher than the sentences imposed 
before 1994. For instance, sentences for burglary used to range from 9-30 
months for first offenders and three years for repeat offenders. The starting 
                                            
130  Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC) (hereafter Kholoviko). 
131  Kholoviko 359-360. Also see Rep v Mwakikunga Confirmation Case No 326 of 1998 
(HC) (public deterred by a "real possibility that a first offence could land you in jail"); 
Rep v Magombo Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011 (HC) ("the likelihood and 
possibility of prison sentence may be more effective than actual imprisonment"). 
132  Kholoviko 360. 
133  For instance, in 1987, Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC) 
recommended that a sentence for rape should start at three years, while in 2007 the 
Judiciary recommended a starting point of 10 years: see Malawi Judiciary 
Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines 5. However, Nani v Rep Criminal Appeal 
No 1 of 2011 (HC) recommended a starting point of six years. 
134  Chizumila 306; Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni [1995] 2 MLR 567 (HC) 571. 
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point for a threshold case of burglary is now six years. These developments 
are premised mainly on the pursuit of deterrence, because it is believed that 
stiffer sentences have a greater deterrent value. This understanding is also 
responsible for the recent enhancement of maximum sentences in the Penal 
Code. In the long run, these enhancements will lead to lengthier sentences 
since the maximum sentence is an indicator of the seriousness of an 
offence, which is the most determinative factor on the quantum of 
punishment.135 
The continued justification of long sentences on the basis of general 
deterrence is particularly perturbing in the light of seeming judicial 
indifference to whether or not longer sentences in fact have a greater 
deterrent value than shorter sentences. Case law does not indicate why 
lengthier sentences are considered to have a greater deterrent effect. 
Courts readily assume that punishment has a deterrent effect and that 
heavier sentences have a greater deterrent value than lighter sentences. 
This is not necessarily the case and is symptomatic of the pitfalls of 
deterrence.  
Therefore, Chizumila can be criticised for concluding, without much proof, 
that short sentences were the reason for the increase in burglary cases at 
the time. Mob justice cannot be blamed on sentencing alone and it is not 
entirely correct to claim that mob justice is an indicator of society's views as 
to the appropriate punishment. In the face of high crime rates, mob justice 
in Malawi is most probably fuelled by a general dissatisfaction with the 
criminal justice system including the failure of police to apprehend suspects 
and the release of suspects on bail. This dissatisfaction is in fact 
antagonistic to the presumption of innocence, especially where an offender 
was caught in flagrante delicto. It is ironic that while courts are unsure as to 
the underlying reasons for an upsurge in mob justice incidents, they have 
by and large responded by imposing harsher sentences. Courts cannot 
endorse such societal views, which at best are uninformed of the sentencing 
process and the circumstances that inform it. Indeed, the question of 
whether or not the sentences imposed on offenders are adequate cannot 
be determined through the lenses of perpetrators of mob justice. The 
majority of such people cannot be within the remit of – to use the words of 
Chombo J – "right-thinking members of the public with full knowledge of the 
relevant facts and circumstances" of the case and who upon learning of the 
sentence can "question the court's sanity" or wonder if "something had gone 
                                            
135  Patel v S Criminal Appeal No 81 of 2007 (HC); Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 
of 1998 (HC). 
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wrong with the administration of justice".136 After all, it is questionable 
whether judicial officers in fact know the views of society.137 
A crucial question that Chizumila raises is how a court can, on the one hand, 
be ostensibly unconcerned about whether imprisonment succeeds in 
deterring offenders and, on the other, justify increasing the level of 
sentences on the basis that lower sentences are incapable of reducing 
crime. The latter reasoning can hold only if the deterrent effect of 
imprisonment is certain and it is known that longer sentences have a greater 
deterrent effect. Therefore, if the court is not interested in knowing whether 
deterrence is at all achieved by imprisonment then it has no basis for 
adopting a sentencing policy that imposes longer sentences in a bid to attain 
deterrence. Such sentences would be contrary to the right to liberty in that 
the deprivation of liberty is not rationally connected to its stated aim. It is 
paradoxical that a court, as the authority responsible for depriving an 
offender of' liberty, has no interest in knowing if the stated aim can be 
achieved but rather proceeds on an assumption that the deprivation of 
liberty for a longer time will achieve the desired goal. A limitation of a right 
is justifiable in terms of section 44 of the Constitution if, among other things, 
it is reasonable in that the aim it seeks to achieve is actually achieved. In 
the context of imprisonment, the deprivation of liberty cannot pass 
constitutional scrutiny where the authority restricting the right is indifferent 
to whether such deprivation will in fact achieve the stated objective.  
Furthermore, the tendency to enhance sentences with little concern as to 
whether the purpose for the enhancement will be achieved violates the right 
to human dignity, because it reduces an offender to a means to an end. In 
this case, an offender is used purely to satisfy public sentiment without any 
regard as to whether the restriction of his rights will achieve the legitimate 
goal of reducing crime. Sentencing cannot be led by public sentiment 
alone;138 if anything, courts must lead public opinion by upholding the 
constitutional rights of offenders. In addition, it is not proper for a court to be 
indifferent to whether an enhanced sentence has a greater deterrent value 
than a lesser sentence, since a limitation must constitute the least restrictive 
means to achieve the objective. Needless to say, public sentiment is not a 
lawful basis on which the right to liberty may be limited. In the case of 
imprisonment, a court cannot justifiably impose a longer sentence in the 
absence of proof that a shorter sentence (a less restrictive means) cannot 
achieve the same objective. This is supported by Chikopa J in Rep v 
                                            
136  Rep v Masula Criminal Case No 65 of 2008 (HC) 4. 
137  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 166. 
138  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 87-89, 187, 199, 265 and 304. 
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Kapitawo, where it was held that a court must not only state its basis for 
claiming that an offence is prevalent but also why the offence is on the 
increase and how or why a stiffer sentence would reverse the situation.139 
Such statements, the judge continued, are matters of fact, the truth of which 
must be carefully established beyond reasonable doubt.140 Therefore, 
indifference to the realisation of the aims of punishment is indefensible and 
duplicitous.  
3.7. Going beyond deterrence 
It is important to note some recent developments regarding the role of 
deterrence in sentencing. In 2013 the High Court issued a string of 
judgments advocating a shift in sentencing policy regarding the punishment 
of serious offences.141 It urged courts to move beyond deterrence as the 
goal of punishment and consider rehabilitation as a legitimate purpose of 
punishment. For instance, in Rep v Keke it was held that public interest goes 
beyond deterrence and extends to the reformation of an offender so that the 
punishment process results in making him a better person in the 
community.142 Further, in a clear departure from the principles advanced in 
earlier cases like Chizumila, the High Court has held that immediate 
imprisonment should not be seen as an automatic disposal of serious 
offences such as burglary and housebreaking; such offences may be 
punished with suspended sentences or indeed a non-custodial sentence 
altogether.143 It has also encouraged the use of non-custodial sentences for 
simple theft.144 
                                            
139  Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005 (HC) 3 
140  Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005 (HC) 3. 
141  See, for instance, Rep v Mushali Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v 
Assam Confirmation Case No 907 of 2008 (HC) 3; Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case 
No 271 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v Kanyumba Confirmation Case No 904 of 2008 (HC) 
3; Rep v Mulolo Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012 (HC) 3; Rep v Kandodo 
Confirmation Case No 240 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 
130 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v Headson Confirmation Case No 129 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep 
v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v James Confirmation Case 
No 244 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v John Confirmation Case No 528 of 2010 (HC) 4; Rep 
v Mapeni Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010, 3; Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 
314 of 2011 (HC) 3; Rep v Naphazi Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011 (HC) 3. All 
the judgments were authored by Mwaungulu J, as he then was. 
142  Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010 (HC) 8.  
143  Rep v James Confirmation Case No 244 of 2013 (HC) 3. Also see Rep v Mushali 
Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 
of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v Kandodo Confirmation Case No 240 of 2013 (HC) 3; Rep v 
Mapeni Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010 (HC) 3; Rep v Yasin Confirmation Case 
No 219 of 2012 (HC) 3. 
144  Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012 (HC) 6. 
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4. Conclusion 
While Malawian courts have long invoked deterrence in sentencing 
offenders, they have not delved into the philosophical aspects of this theory. 
Deterrence retains a significant role in sentencing and is often cited to justify 
stiff sentences for serious and prevalent offences. Malawian sentencing 
jurisprudence reflects some of the shortcomings of deterrence. While courts 
recognise that deterrence carries the risk of the instrumentalisation of 
offenders, this is deemed problematic only when dealing with first offenders. 
Further, general deterrence is understood to require punishment that 
exceeds what is proportional to the offence. It is therefore recommended 
that courts should give rehabilitation a greater role in sentencing and infuse 
sentencing decisions with constitutional and international standards. Courts 
should also reconsider the conceptualisation of general deterrence. Indeed, 
once it is accepted, as Malawian courts have done, that general deterrence 
may lead to disproportionate sentences, and that this would infringe the right 
to human dignity and the prohibition of cruel and degrading treatment, it is 
futile to assert that repeat offenders may be subjected to general deterrent 
sentences. It must be recalled that the right to human dignity will be violated 
where the length of sentence is not commensurate with the gravity of an 
offence, regardless of whether the sentence has been overtaken by penal 
objectives such as deterrence or even rehabilitation. In this regard, it is 
recommended that courts must adopt a stricter interpretation of 
proportionality, which does not allow for punishment that exceeds the 
bounds commensurate with the offence. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Andenaes Punishment and Deterrence 
Andenaes J Punishment and Deterrence (Michigan University Press Ann 
Arbour 1974) 
Apel and Nagin "General Deterrence" 
Apel R and Nagin DS "General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence" 
in Wilson JQ and Petersilia J (eds) Crime and Public Policy (Oxford 
University Press New York 2011) 411-436 
Bentham "Comment on the Commentaries" 
Bentham J "A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on 
Government" (edited by Burns JH and Hart HLA) in The Collected Works of 
Jeremy Bentham (Oxford University Press London 1977) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  26 
Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation 
Bentham J An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(edited by Burns JH and Hart HLA) (Methuen London 1982)  
Bykvist Utilitarianism 
Bykvist K Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum International 
London 2010) 
Cavadino and Dignan Penal System 
Cavadino M and Dignan J The Penal System: An Introduction (SAGE 
London 2002) 
Chirwa Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution 
Chirwa DM Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution (Juta Cape 
Town 2011) 
Christopher 2002 NWULR 
Christopher RL "Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of 'Just' Punishment" 
2002 Northwestern University Law Review 843-976 
Fox and Freiberg Sentencing 
Fox R and Freiberg A Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2001) 
Geerken and Gove 1975 Law & Soc'y Rev 
Geerken MR and Gove WR "Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations" 
1975 Law & Soc'y Rev 497-513 
Gumboh 2017 JAL 
Gumboh E "A Critical Analysis of Life Imprisonment in Malawi" 2017 JAL 
443-466 
Hospers Human Conduct 
Hospers J Human Conduct: An Introduction to the Problems of Ethics 
(Thomson Learning New York 1961) 
Kant "Penal Law and the Law of Pardon" 
Kant I "The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon" in Tonry M (ed) Why Punish? 
How Much? A Reader on Punishment (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2010) 31-36 
Maestro Cesare Beccaria 
Maestro MT Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform (Temple 
University Press Philadelphia 1973) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  27 
Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines 
Malawi Judiciary Magistrate's Court Sentencing Guidelines (unpublished 
2007) 
Marsh, Cochrane and Melville Criminal Justice 
Marsh I, Cochrane J and Melville G Criminal Justice: An Introduction to 
Philosophies, Theories and Practice (Routledge London 2004) 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 
Terblanche SS Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (LexisNexis Durban 
2009) 
Van Den Haag 1982 J Crim L & Criminology 
Van Den Haag E "Could Successful Rehabilitation Reduce the Crime 
Rate?" 1982 J Crim L & Criminology 1022-1035 
Wasik Emmins on Sentencing 
Wasik J Emmins on Sentencing (Blackstone London 1998) 
Zimring Perspectives on Deterrence 
Zimring FE Perspectives on Deterrence (National Institute of Mental Health 
Washington 1971) 
Case law 
Banda v Rep [1990] 13 MLR 56 (SCA) 
Banda v Rep Criminal Appeal No 221 of 2009 (HC) 
Bwanali v R [1964-1966] 3 ALR Mal 329 (HC) 
Chief Public Prosecutor v Nkosi [1990] 13 MLR 97 (HC) 
Chitsonga v Rep [1995] 1 MLR 86 (HC) 
Dandaula v Rep Criminal Appeal No 11 of 2008 (HC) 
Daukire v Rep Criminal Appeal No 148 of 2004 (HC) 
John v Rep Criminal Appeal No 131 of 1975 (HC) 
Kafkaris v Cyprus [2008] ECtHR 
Kalambo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 199 of 1975 (HC) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  28 
Kamil v Rep [1973-1974] 7 MLR 169 (SCA) 
Kanyinji v Rep Criminal Appeal No 116 of 2008 (HC) 
Kapolo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 82 of 2007 (HC) 
Kumwenda v Rep (1993) 16(1) MLR 233 (SCA) 
Lobo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 110 of 2008 (HC) 
Lusale v Rep Criminal Case No 141 of 2005 (HC) 
Maikolo v R [1964-1966] 3 ALR Mal 584 (SCA) 
Makanjira v Rep Criminal Appeal No 67 of 2007 (HC) 
Makawa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 196 of 1975 (HC) 
Maniote v Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 174 (HC) 
Masangano v Attorney General Constitutional Case No 15 of 2007 (HC) 
Mbekeani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 48 of 2006 (HC) 
Millo v Rep Criminal Appeal No 30 of 2000 (HC) 
Moses v Rep Confirmation Case No 140 of 2011 (HC) 
Mpondamwala v Rep [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 306 (HC) 
Mtanga v Rep Criminal Appeal No 15 of 1998 (HC) 
Mtetera v Rep Criminal Appeal No 88 of 2005 (HC) 
Mulewa v Rep [1997] 2 MLR 60 (HC) 
Mussa v Rep Criminal Appeal No 44 of 1995 (HC) 
Mwachilira v Rep Criminal Appeal Case No 86 of 2006 (HC) 
Nani v Rep Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2011 (HC) 
Patel v S Criminal Appeal No 81 of 2007 (HC) 
R v Curran 57 Cr App R 945 
R v Robert [1961-1963] 2 ALR Mal 291 (HC) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  29 
R v White [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 401 (HC) 
R v Zagwa [1923-1960] 1 ALR Mal 415 (HC) 
Rendall-Day v Rep [1966-1968] 4 ALR Mal 155 (HC) 
Rep v Adam Confirmation Case No 500 of 1995 (HC) 
Rep v Akishoni Confirmation Case No 196 of 1997 (HC) 
Rep v Alick Confirmation Case No 725 of 2000 (HC) 
Rep v Asidi Confirmation Case No 955 of 1999 (HC) 
Rep v Assam Confirmation Case No 907 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Austin Confirmation Case No 1222 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Banda [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal (HC) 
Rep v Banda Confirmation Case No 633 of 1999 (HC) 
Rep v Bayani Confirmation Case No 11 of 2000 (HC) 
Rep v Chavula Criminal Appeal No 93 of 2005 (HC) 
Rep v Chikwana Confirmation Case No 131 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Chilenje [1996] MLR 361 (HC) 
Rep v Chimbelenga [1996] MLR 342 (HC) 
Rep v Chinthiti (2) [1997] 1 MLR 70 (HC) 
Rep v Chirwa Confirmation Case No 271 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Chitseko Confirmation Case No 78 of 1997 (HC) 
Rep v Chizenga Confirmation Case No 297 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Chizumila [1994] MLR 288 (HC) 
Rep v Domingo Confirmation Case No 850 of 1990 (HC) 
Rep v Eneya Criminal Case No 53 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Foster Confirmation Case No 1690 of 2005 (HC) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  30 
Rep v Gwaza [1995] 2 MLR 752 (HC) 
Rep v Harry [1997] 1 MLR 119 (HC) 
Rep v Harry [1997] 2 MLR 74 (HC) 
Rep v Havula [1991] 14 MLR 429 (HC) 
Rep v Headson Confirmation Case No 129 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Iddi Confirmation Case No 48 of 1998 (HC) 
Rep v Jali Confirmation Case No 228 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v James Confirmation Case No 244 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Jeke Confirmation Case No 178B of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v John Confirmation Case No 528 of 2010 (HC) 
Rep v Josephy Confirmation Case No 261 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Jumbe Criminal Appeal No 565 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Kachimanga Confirmation Case No 1746 of 2007 (HC) 
Rep v Kafwambira Confirmation Case No 37 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Kandodo Confirmation Case No 240 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Kanena Confirmation Case No 130 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Kanyumba Confirmation Case No 904 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Kapitawo Confirmation Case No 303 of 2005 (HC) 
Rep v Kathumba [1997] 1 MLR 390 (HC) 
Rep v Katole [1993] 16(1) MLR 472 (HC) 
Rep v Kaufa Confirmation Case No 314 of 2011 (HC) 
Rep v Kayenda Confirmation Case No 220 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Keke Confirmation Case No 404 of 2010 (HC) 
Rep v Kholoviko [1996] MLR 355 (HC) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  31 
Rep v Kotamu Confirmation Case No 180 of 2012 (HC) 
Rep v Kufandiko Confirmation Case No 126 of 2009 (HC) 
Rep v Lampu Confirmation Case No 89 of 1996 (HC) 
Rep v Limbani Confirmation Case No 839 of 2005 (HC) 
Rep v Madando [1995] 2 MLR 733 (HC) 
Rep v Madelube Criminal Case No 105 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Mafaiti Confirmation Case No 660 of 1990 (HC) 
Rep v Magombo Confirmation Case No 264 of 2011 (HC) 
Rep v Makata Confirmation Case 968 of 1996 (HC) 
Rep v Mapeni Confirmation Case No 466 of 2010 (HC) 
Rep v Masula Criminal Case No 65 of 2008 (HC) 
Rep v Matiki [1997] 1 MLR 159 (HC) 
Rep v Matindi Confirmation Case No 1699 of 1976 (HC) 
Rep v Misomali Confirmation Case No 527 of 1996 (HC) 
Rep v Mkoma [1995] 2 MLR 598 (HC) 
Rep v Mpira [1982-1984] 10 ALR Mal 67 (HC) 
Rep v Msowoya [1987-1989] 12 ALR Mal 394 (HC) 
Rep v Mtaya Confirmation Case No 98 of 1995 (HC) 
Rep v Mulolo Confirmation Case No 362 of 2012 (HC) 
Rep v Mushali Confirmation Case No 242 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Mutawo Confirmation Case No 237 of 1999 (HC) 
Rep v Mwakikunga Confirmation Case No 326 of 1998 (HC) 
Rep v Mzuzi Confirmation Case No 1607 of 1998 (HC) 
Rep v Nabanda [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 166 (HC) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  32 
Rep v Naphazi Confirmation Case No 386 of 2011 (HC) 
Rep v Napulula Confirmation Case No 665 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Ndamera Confirmation Case No 314 of 2001 (HC) 
Rep v Ngomwa Confirmation Case No 1021 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Nkhata Confirmation Case No 534 of 2003 (HC) 
Rep v Nkhoma Confirmation Case No 3 of 1996 (HC) 
Rep v Nthara [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 338 (HC) 
Rep v Nyungwe [1997] 2 MLR 127 (HC) 
Rep v Phale [1991] 14 MLR 438 (HC) 
Rep v Phiri [1984-1986] 11 ALR Mal 176 (HC) 
Rep v Phiri [1993] 16(2) MLR 748 (HC) 
Rep v Phiri [1996] MLR 365 (HC) 
Rep v Phiri [1997] 2 MLR 92 (HC) 
Rep v Sakhwinya Confirmation Case No 359 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Samson Confirmation Case No 169 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Sozinyo [1997] 2 MLR 16 (HC) 
Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 726 of 2000 (HC) 
Rep v Tembo Confirmation Case No 187 of 2013 (HC) 
Rep v Tomasi [1997] 2 MLR 70 (HC) 
Rep v Wilson; Rep v Khapuleni [1995] 2 MLR 567 (HC) 
Rep v Yasin Confirmation Case No 219 of 2012 (HC) 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 
Vinter v United Kingdom Application Nos 66069/09, 3896/10 and 130/10, 
Merits, 9 July 2013 (ECtHR) 
E GUMBOH  PER / PELJ 2017 (20)  33 
White v Rep Criminal Appeal No 19 of 2007 (HC) 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994 
Penal Code, Chapter 7:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
Road Traffic Act, Chapter 69:01 of the Laws of Malawi 
International instruments 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
Internet sources 
Beccaria 1764 http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v 
6.0.pdf 
Beccaria CB 1764 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf 
accessed 20 November 2017 
List of Abbreviations 
J Crim L & Criminology Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
JAL Journal of African Law 
Law & Soc'y Rev Law and Society Review 
MSCA Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal 
NWULR Northwestern University Law Review 
 
